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Eyal Amiran (amiran@uci.edu) has published an essay in minnesota review before, on the imaginary of publishing; he has also published diverse works on narrative and textual theory, twentieth-century literature, and digital media. He edits the journal Postmodern Culture and is Associate Professor of Comparative Literature and Film and Media Studies at UC Irvine.

ns 69 | Fall/Winter 2007

Featuring an interview with MH Abrams, reviews of new books by Walter Benn Michaels, John McGowan, and Paul Smith, plus a special section on online criticism.

Read this Issue

Published Spring 2006

Revolution in Abstraction

(on Alan Liu, The Laws of Cool: Knowledge Work and the Culture of Information [U of Chicago P, 2004] and McKenzie Wark, A Hacker Manifesto [Harvard UP, 2004])

by Eyal Amiran | ns 65-66

Literary and technological cultures have been converging for some decades, so goes one argument, maybe since C.P. Snow announced the divergence of the twain. Complementarily, to justify the humanities we increasingly need to show their utility. So Jay Clayton, for instance, argues that "a critical engagement with technology, not withdrawal, is the best hope for what were once called humanist values. Celebrating nonconformity and disciplinary anarchism will not suffice for people who care about creating a just society" (825). In a statement supporting his candidacy to become the MLA's Second Vice President, Gerald Graff writes that "to attract increased financial support, higher education needs to become more aggressive in demonstrating the usefulness of our scholarship and teaching to a wider range of publics." These claims continue a trend begun at least in the 1970s, as Rita Raley writes, to see the academy converging with networked business and technology.1 This position has received a boost with the publication of Alan Liu's The Laws of Cool (2004). Liu sees the "coolness" of tech culture as its compensation for colluding with business interests, and proposes that "the humanities and arts" become more tech-savvy, "adequate to an age of knowledge work" (288). Against the Heideggerian position that the "essence" of technology is destructive instrumentality (though Heidegger is nowhere cited), Liu argues that "there can be something deeply humane, and technologically aware, about technique" (307). The humanities must begin to teach technical skills and become itself more like science and business in its research and production models (312-13).

The key word in these accounts of harmonic convergence is "humanist": Clayton calls for "humanist values," Liu for "humane" techne. That is what separates their claims from McKenzie Wark's recent Hacker Manifesto, though superficially they resemble each other. As Liu wrote in an earlier essay:

My highest ambition for cultural criticism and the creative arts, in short, is that they can in tandem become 'ethical hackers' of knowledge work... . Many intellectuals and artists will become so like the icy "New Class" of knowledge workers that there will be no difference; they will be subsumed wholly within their New Economy roles as symbolic analysts, consultants, and designers. But some, in league with everyday hackers in the technical, managerial, professional, and clerical mainstream of knowledge work itself, may break through the ice. (Clayton n.25)

It's Left-humanist agency Liu wants – to be more efficient agents, possibly, for capitalism with a human face (314). Wark opposes this construction from a structural, materialist perspective. His call for a "hacker revolution," first disseminated on the web, is predictable and workaday when it applies Marxism in the electronic (if not entirely post-national) age, but its logic overturns assumptions of Left studies of virtual culture and intervenes in debates about radical difference and identity politics. In the Manifesto startling ideas emerge from familiar materialist assumptions about class, surplus, exploitation, and social change. It is a manifesto not only because it energizes us to action, but also because it values manifestation, embodiment as praxis and as antidote to representation. Yet it may not be willing to endorse all it embodies.

Wark's materialist scenario is familiar, but because it is written under the sign of Deleuze as well as under the banner of Marx, it opens (a good word in Wark's lexicon) the way to complexity: where Marx's manifesto simplifies, Wark's investment in abstraction, new modes of information, and difference complicates. Each mode of production also produces its own ruling class: land the pastoralists, capital the capitalists, and information the "vectoralists," a class that profits from the management and control of information ("class" 31).2 Each mode is more abstract than its predecessor, and more vectoral or given to change. Hackers by definition produce change and can help transform the system and free the world for everyone. In this way hackers can redeem themselves too from their having taken part, rather willingly ("property" 196), in the production of HAL and iTunes. The vector is any means for transporting things and bringing about change (313). It is the potential to make anything a resource and to put it into relation with anything else ("vector" 332). Unlike capital, which is only an abstraction of property (315), the vector is not simply the property of vectoralists but something more fundamental and abstract, a principle of transformation and exchange, of surplus, of differentiation that underlies previous modes of production as well. Hence hackers are not the political interventionists valorized, for example by Andrew Ross, when hacking first came up on the cultural screen in the late 1980s (Ross paragraphs 1-2); nor are they only the "intellectuals" with whom Eagleton identifies them in his review of this book (Eagleton); they are any information workers who can "hack" or intervene in and direct vectors.

The vectoralists charge usuriously for access to information ("abstraction" 22) and enforce a myth of scarcity ("abstraction" 23). They reduce information to communication (abstraction to utility), just as they reduce expression to representation and productivity to commodities ("production" 174). They monopolize information, as land and property have been monopolized in turn by previous regimes, "because they control the vectors along which information is abstracted" ("class" 29). How these vectors work isn't a concern in Wark's study. For Wark, this information can be hoarded and monopolized: yet it might escape efforts to control it, and not simply by the agency of hackers. And isn't that information self-differential to the point that, whenever it is used or created, it is already multiple, a double of itself, as Wark implies in the echoing first line of the manifesto ("A double spooks the world")?

The first of Wark's seventeen sections is "abstraction," the second "class." As a manifesto about contemporary material organization this work is abstract, and its performance of abstraction is one of its contributions to the theory of information as a commodity. If for Marx abstraction is unusefully superstructural, here it is part of the political activity that will overthrow vectoralism from within ("surplus" 309). Hackers are an abstract class ("abstraction" 6), abstractly speaking, but they have not quite cohered into a regular class, "a class for itself" ("hacking" 82, and see "hacking" 86). Because they produce new means of production, they have a special place in the history of productive classes ("history" 114). In fact the farmers and workers have failed to overthrow class rule in the past because "the property form is not yet abstract enough to release the virtuality of classlessness that is latent in the productive energies of abstraction" ("abstraction" 19). The hacker class must help farmers and workers discover that "information wants to be free" ("surplus" 311) – a phrase authored by Stewart Brand, the publisher of The Well and of the Whole Earth Catalog, at the first Hacker's Conference in 1984 (Liu 426 n.161). Unlike traditional property, information is abstract and in principle classless, so it can be the agent in reform that traditional property could not be. It is in principle universal, and infinite in its potential ("history" 123). Here is another of those places in Wark where the predictable turns unpredictable. Where for the Rousseauvian tradition abstraction is a cultural product, restrained and social, for Wark it is "the nature of nature," a second nature of nature which allows for free production and creativity ("hacking" 75). In other words, here the social is free and natural, so long as it is truly abstract.

It is abstraction that drives social change, and for that reason hackers, who multiply abstraction, are special agents of change. Hackers and the productive classes are the source of all creativity—"all the images, the stories, the wild profusions of all that culture becomes" ("surplus" 308). Capital was more abstract than land, and so had more revolutionary potential ("history" 107). Information is more abstract still. Correspondingly, society is increasingly governed by law because as it develops it produces more abstraction, and it is law that regulates abstract property ("history" 108). This implicit intervention into the "force of law" debate (Derrida's phrase is repeated) demonstrates an advantage of thinking with Wark's reframed paradigm and its emphasis on abstraction. By this logic, however, the social change that did take place shows the work of abstraction and of hacking. The left has failed to mobilize the workers around revolt: 1989 only reinforced global vectoralist interests ("revolt" 242). Instead there is a "third way" of hacking – an expressive hacking without or outside of representation ("revolt" 251). This is said to be not a utopian notion ("representation" 231) but a practical one, and holds on to that praxis with its one example: information. All other forms of property are exclusive ("revolt" 253).

If abstraction is a kind of action – at least the differential Deleuzian kind of abstraction – then some action can seem remote, vague, and complacent. Wark has been critiqued for writing about hacking but leaving out cyberspace in the Manifesto and in his Virtual Geography: Living with Global Media Events. Chris McGahan notes:

An unfortunate feature of these books is the degree to which they speak about hackers (however broadly categorized) or the mythical "digital sublime" while paying little attention to what actually happens when hackers become involved in or are subjected to Internet social networks, institutional protocols, and cultural genres. One can search almost entirely in vain in these texts for specific instances of cybercultural practice. (McGahan paragraph 4)

There are, one can add along these lines, practical hacking how-to zines that tutor digital revolutionariness. While I understand why critics might want Wark to speak to pressing social issues in what the Revolutionary Communist Party refers to as "these dangerous times" (RCP), this complaint misses the point of the manifesto's focus. Such critique sides in principle with Alan Liu and others who are interested in social studies of internet culture. For Liu, the investment in particular social practices and institutions comes precisely because he does not believe the abstract hype. He writes that "knowledge workers embarrass the Marxist binary between capitalists and workers" (Liu 31)—"fatally." The new information industry has changed the dynamic of social forces, according to Liu: "groups and classes among knowledge workers have now been neutralized where they most count – in the culture of production – even as the need for the identity function they once supplied continues unabated" (70). Thus a social account of internet practices stands opposed to Wark's theoretical Marxism.

Liu proposes to get humanities departments to teach practical technical skills (Liu 312-15) – more instrumental action than the abstract Deleuzian production advocated in Wark. While education, for Wark, is not knowledge (Wark "education" 57) – in fact it is slavery – and while academics can be absorbed, a la Adorno and Horkheimer's culture industry, into vectoralist interests ("education" 67, "representation" 211, "representation" 225), there are ways academics can struggle for the autonomy of knowledge ("education" 63). These include solidarity with workers and working toward democratic institutions. But can knowledge be autonomous? Is there, with Deleuze, a knowledge that is not by definition a commodity? Data that is all noise?

These questions dog Wark's way around the problem of his own abstraction, which is to short-circuit the importance of historical knowledge for reform. Wark presents a tacit reply to Walter Benn Michaels, who argues that we have no obligation to the past because it is not ours in the present (e.g. Michaels 129-68). For Wark we do have an obligation, which is to live based on the struggles of the past, to keep them going. The historical knowledge hackers lack is embodied in the working classes ("production" 173), and it is from them that this knowledge can be had, as it were, without knowing it – through living and praxis. This is an unusually disengaged argument, even as it relies on embodiment.

Wark is consistent in arguing for praxis based in abstract history rather than for a kind of classless instrumentalism, and yet in developing this position he appears to separate living from knowing, rather than to combine them: the hackers are subjective, the workers and farmers objective ("production" 174). Further, both workers and history are connected to a natural world that precedes social construction. That, I think, is the more pressing problem with Wark's use of history, and it takes several forms in the work. The Manifesto seems to subscribe to a form of naturalism, as when it assumes that people hack new concepts "out of raw data" ("abstraction" 2). Is there such a thing as "raw data"? If in the age of digital information "the virtuality of nature" is "released into the world" ("vector" 324), does that mean that there is a quality of nature that is there to be released. And if it's not an essence or a property of nature, something natural to it, then what is it? One of the projects of the work seems to be to rehabilitate the concept of "nature" for Marxist analysis in an age that at least considers the concept challenging. "Nature" is one of the book's chapter-categories, where Wark makes it clear that he does not call for a nostalgic return to a nature that precedes the social ("nature" 150); he agrees that a wholeness of being is imaginary ("production" 171). Yet he writes that hackers work to give "the world as a whole the right to manage its own development" ("abstraction" 12), and that collective human productivity affirms "nature's own productivity" ("nature" 150).

Wark's attack on representation also follows from his Deleuzian assumptions. Where for Liu information workers provide identity and style – "cool" – for Wark they help fight identity and representation. In Wark's vocabulary, representation is bad, expression good. Property is representation ("representation" 209), and hacking of virtual potential is expression. Hence the production of virtual reality is a form of praxis ("representation" 210) redeemed from the idea that it is idle bourgeois waste. Self-representation has an important place in Wark's account of social change. It is the traditional work of the intelligentsia to help raise class consciousness. But this work is achieved mostly by hacking, broadly conceived. Hackers must fight the state, which is the prime agent for representation, channeling people's ideas of themselves. This is particularly true of the productive classes, which seem in more danger than other classes from the pull of state-sponsored nationalism and identity politics ("world" 375-76). Without the redemptive consciousness of hackers, the workers remain too much in the realm of representation ("world" 384).

Class is a product of false representation, a form of identity politics ("representation" 215-217) refereed by the state (218). Two classes avoid this statist fate: the ruling classes, which escape representation (218, 221), and the hackers, who reject it (222). The state regulates and assigns identity politics. In the vectoralist age, the state's work of representation has been largely taken over by the transnational vectoralists ("history" 117). Far from flattening the earth, vectoral interests produce its representations. Here Wark is closer to Hardt and Negri's Empire (which he criticizes astutely in a note to "revolt" 240) – sadly there is no index to this Manifesto, though discursive notes focus discussion of recent scholarship – and repeats aspects of the old model of Marxist struggle that precedes "late-capitalism."

The price of representation (identity politics) is that one then becomes the agent of the state ("representation" 230). Desire to support the state and desire to destroy the state both take state representations and identity politics too much to heart:

Violence against the state, which rarely amounts to more than throwing rocks at its police, is merely the desire for the state expressed in its masochistic form. Where some call for a state that embraces their representation, others call for a state that beats them up. Neither is a politics that escapes the desire cultivated within the subject by the educational apparatus – the state of desire that is merely desire for the state. ("representation" 227, and see "state" 273)

Against state-made identity, Wark turns to a Deleuzian refusal of representation itself, which, though Wark rejects critical negation in favor of "a positive hacking" ("representation" 207), turns out to be a version of Adorno's negative position after all ("representation" 231). Anything can be turned into a representation (Adorno), except the hack that renews difference itself (Deleuze) ("representation" 225). Hackers, again, escape representation because they express their desire rather than represent it ("state" 274). In his argument about representation Wark stages an implicit contest between Adorno and Deleuze in which the two emerge as compatible after all.

The great force fighting representation and vectoralist control is differentiation. Hackers can succeed against the empire because they use the force – they are agents of difference. Wark assumes that "to hack is to differ" ("abstraction" 3). It could be that difference is a good in itself as an agent of change and as a quality of social experience ("class" 44, "education" 69). This assumption has been challenged by centrists like Walter Benn Michaels and Richard Rorty: Rorty sees difference everywhere between and within social bodies, so that cultural differences in the US have not grown or diminished over the last century (e.g., Rorty, et al. 22-29), whereas Michaels has a hard time seeing difference at all. For example, he thinks social class is only determined by how much money you have (e.g., Michaels 150-51), as though all cultural capital translates directly into cash. Both think we can leave our pasts (hence cultural differences) largely behind us. But it is hard to dismiss the importance of difference. Without diversity there is less chance for difference or dissent to be legitimate, and it is only difference as a social condition that challenges the absolutism and naturalism of the norm. For Wark the valorization of difference comes more from Deleuze than from arguments on the Left about that very point ("information" 130). Free information expresses difference, and difference expresses information ("information" 139). For Wark, heterogeneity is assumed to reflect free expression ("world" 373), whereas the vectoralist interest homogenizes the world into one giant shopping mall.

One logical product of the Manifesto's investment in difference is that, as the first line implies, it sees doubling as an historical logic. Most things can double. For example, through labor, class becomes the second nature of nature ("vector" 323), and is then seen as nature itself ("nature" 146); that process then repeats – indeed it can keep repeating ("nature" 156) – and the representation and contextualization of second nature appears as a third nature (153-56). Likewise hacking is "the production of production" ("production" 158), and abstract finance is the vampire of the vampire that is the ruling class ("production" 169).

But there are dangers to Wark's investment in difference. It totalizes social and political classes and nation states, and endorses a simple binary: the good are differential, the bad are unitary. It may also deny the forces of difference within social or political bodies. The book does not see hacking as a principle of difference within bodies, but as a force that opposes such bodies and interests, particularly those of the vectoralists. There are other problems with this vision of hacking as the agent of difference. Hackers alone discover means of creating new worlds ("abstraction" 4). Does this mean that only "we" create the new worlds, or that whoever participates in creating them is de facto a hacker? Through difference, hackers redeem not only themselves but, in effect, a version of the current system – except that in the redeemed system information would be free and vectoralists would not profit at the expense of the productive classes. In this Wark recognizes implicitly the potential for radical individuality at the heart of Marx's collective vision. For Wark "democracy" is not a bad word, and surplus is also a good. He indicts some aspects of modern society here and there – he subpoenas religion in passing ("subject" 283) – but he does not update Marx's attacks on marriage as prostitution or on the family as unpaid labor resource. Does the commitment to radical difference assume that role? Occasionally Wark sounds angry – no indignity is too great in the name of profit, he says rightly ("history" 102) – but his focus on principles excludes not only history but specific grievances as well.

While the manifesto agrees with and updates Marx, it also rewrites Marx. Certainly much remains from the mid-1800s. The idealist potential of the (hacker) revolution is still to arrive at "a world free from necessity" and want ("abstraction" 11); the enemy is still the ruling (vectoralist) class that seeks to control innovation and to profit from it. The "property" section is the least interesting in the book, because it recounts the familiar Marxist paradigm of class exploitation (e.g., 186); it is animated more by a desire for completeness that is inimical to the manifesto spirit evident elsewhere. If the form of property has changed, from land to products to information, the paradigm of property and its control obtains since feudalism ("class" 33, "production" 175). But Marx is not the same after Deleuze. With difference a new key, and revolution a continual process of emancipation through hacking, the old terms no longer work as they did. Even class is revised. The new qualities of information, including abstractness, have a chance of undermining the exclusive system of ownership based on artificial lack. Under the sign of information, class struggle promotes abstraction ("class" 38), and that can make all the difference.

An ad for Apple's Macintosh shows the computer and Karl Marx together and announces: "It was about time a capitalist started a revolution" (Dean 51). That was in 1984, the year of the first Hacker Conference. In the twenty years since then, Apple has been proven right, except that the electronic revolution has not been the sort one can start, and Apple didn't start it. Their point in the ad is that Apple empowers the little people against big IBM and Microsoft – a line some Apple customers still buy – but the model of such empowerment sides with the humanist action structure that helps Microsoft rule the world. The capitalist revolution is part of capitalism, not part of revolution. Apple may use its workers differently than HAL does, but Google's position that "You can make money without doing evil" (Google) cannot work realistically for them, so long as they operate in the only world we have. If Google works in China, it is doing evil along with whatever else it is doing.

That sort of injunction motivates efforts to make education more productive in the technological environment, to involve students and teachers in the practical needs of business, to develop long-distance teaching models for the university, and the like. As Jodi Dean argues:

Technoculture is not a nightmarish technocracy ruled by an autocratic Big Brother. Instead, it's a new power formation where the ideals of publicity, of equal access, free information and non-stop, multichanneled communication, support the digital networks of global capital. In this context, publicity serves the information age. If technocracy aimed to eliminate politics in the name of efficient administration, technoculture forecloses politics in the name of communication. (Dean 78)

We can be realistic pragmatists, with the humanists, and get with the program, or we can join the heroic resistance. Either way we lose, because even the corporate counter-culturalist, as an agent, is a contradiction in terms and serves the fantasy of Apple's good capitalism, nothing less. The way forward, as Wark seems to see it, is to dissolve into the fabric of things, to hack from within, with the differential powers of language on our side. It's the idealism of materialism – available from your server – and we really want it now.

* * *

Notes

1. Raley writes that:

2. Wark numbers paragraphs and not pages

* * *

Works Cited

Clayton, Jay. "Convergence of the Two Cultures: A Geek's Guide to Contemporary Literature." American Literature 74 (2002): 807-31.

Dean, Jodi. "From Technocracy to Technoculture." Theory and Event 5.1 (2001). http://muse.jhu.edu.

Eagleton, Terry. "Office Politics." The Nation 25 Oct. 2004. http://www.thenation.com/doc/20041025/eagleton.

Google. "Google Corporate Information: Our Philosophy." http://www.google.com/corporate/tenthings.shtml. Nov. 14, 2005.

Graff, Gerald. Candidate statement, Modern Language Association 2005 elections. http://www.mla.org/pdf/candidateinfo05v4.pdf (Oct. 17, 2005).

Liu, Alan. The Laws of Cool: Knowledge Work and the Culture of Information. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2004.

McGahan, Chris. "Whither the Actually Existing Internet?" Postmodern Culture 15.2 (Jan. 2005). http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/postmodern_culture/.

Michaels, Walter Benn. The Shape of the Signifier: 1967 to the End of History. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2004.

Raley, Rita. "eEmpires." Cultural Critique 57 (2004): 111-50.

Revolutionary Communist Party. "RC4 tour 05." Promotional postcard. Los Angeles, CA, 2005.

Rorty, Richard, Derek Nystrom, and Kent Puckett. Against Bosses, Against Oligarchies: A Conversation with Richard Rorty. Chicago: Prickly Paradigm, 2002.

Ross, Andrew. "Hacking Away at the Counterculture." Postmodern Culture 1.1 (Sept. 1990). http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/postmodern_culture/.

Wark, McKenzie. A Hacker Manifesto. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2004.

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