Published Spring 2006
 
Manufacturing War
(on Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed, The War on Freedom: How and Why
America Was Attacked September 11, 2001 [Joshua Tree: Media
Messenger-Tree of Life, 2002]; Jean-Charles Brisard and Guillaume
Dasquiè, Forbidden Truth: U.S.-Taliban Secret Oil Diplomacy
and the Failed Hunt for Bin Laden, trans. Lucy Rounds [New York:
Thunder's Mouth, 2002]; and Noam Chomsky, 9-11 [New York:
Open Media-Seven Stories, 2001])
War, it will be seen, not only accomplishes the necessary destruction,
but accomplishes it in a psychologically acceptable way. In principle,
it would be quite simple to waste the surplus labor of the world
by building temples and pyramids, by digging holes and filling them
up again, or even by producing vast quantities of goods and then
setting fire to them. But this would provide only the economic and
not the emotional basis for a hierarchical society. [...] In other
words it is necessary that [the citizen] should have the mentality
appropriate to a state of war. It does not matter that the war is
actually happening, and, since no decisive victory is possible,
it does not matter whether the war is going well or badly. All that
is needed is that a state of war should exist.
—Emmanuel Goldstein
The Theory and Practice of Oligarchical Collectivism
The militaristic moral and political economy of Oceania in Orwell's
1984 is a product of totalitarianism. It also describes, some argue,
the "post-9-11" era and the "Global War on Terror" (GWT). In calling
for a global response to 9-11, George W. Bush has made an ultimatum,
an international invitation to join a war that must target dozens
of countries to be "won." This universal challenge to fight the
"evil" seeking to destroy "civilization" is essentially an annunciation
of "World War." Perhaps the name "WW III" has not stuck because
this new kind of war looks nothing like its Cold War-era predictions.
WW III was to be unwinnable and something akin to Armageddon.
The cultivation of a xenophobic war-time affect among the American
population since 9-11 is also evidence of a true world war. Having
a population with a "mentality appropriate to a state of war" emboldens
the Bush administration to boast that finding WMDs in Iraq is irrelevant,
despite world-wide skepticism. It emboldens Bush to repackage illegal
domestic wiretaps as "terrorist surveillance" and to speak of this
extra-legal NSA program with pride. Given the global scope of the
battleground in the War on Terror, it was only natural for the Bush
administration to do its best to make al Qaeda part of its case
for war in Iraq, regardless of the evidence. Thus, rather than the
"Second Gulf War," the current war in Iraq is but a front in the
GWT. This both lowers expectations for success—limited success on
a front need not prevent overall success—and legitimates the GWT
as a whole. Linking the current war in Iraq to 9-11 also reinforces
the definition of the GWT as a World War. It is precisely the vast,
global nature of 9-11 and its roots that make the event perfect
for conspiracy theory.
Among the many books that have been published on 9-11 in less than
five years, only a few argue that 9-11 was more than a devastating
terror attack and a declaration of war. While much that has been
published on the subject of "9-11" deals with biography, with the
history or roots of the largest terrorist attack ever on U.S. soil,
or with how the attack was actually conducted, only a few books
on 9-11 have sought to define the event as resulting from conspiracy,
not merely a matter of terror, neglect, incompetence, or systemic
imperfections. There are three main themes or types of conspiracy
theory among those few books in the emerging 9-11 genre that seriously
consider the idea of conspiracy. First, 9-11 is a pretext for the
U.S. government to consolidate domestic power. Second, 9-11 is the
result of a U.S. governmental and corporate conspiracy to control
Central Asian oil. And, third, 9-11 involves a conspiracy by the
U.S. and Saudi Arabia to control the Middle East. It should also
be said that none of the three types of conspiracy theory sees fears
of globalization or cultural hegemony as being a cause or goal of
any 9-11 conspiracy: globalization and global struggle actually
benefit both the West and radical Islamism. (It should be noted
that none of these conspiracy theories buys into the notion of a
Zionist conspiracy, which is perhaps a fourth type of conspiracy
theory that some have offered in the wake of 9-11, though not in
book-length form.)
Three books, published less than a year after 9-11, stand out among
those theorizing conspiracy. In 9-11 (2001), a collection of interviews,
Noam Chomsky places 9-11 within a broader conspiracy between government
and multinational corporations that he has explored in many books,
most notably in Manufacturing Consent. Forbidden Truth (2002), by
investigative journalists Jean-Charles Brisard and Guillaume Dasquié,
argues that disputes over rights to Central Asian petroleum and
gas fueled 9-11. Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed's The War on Freedom (2002)
is at once a reference work about the events surrounding 9-11, and
an argument about the conspiracy behind the failure to prevent the
actual attacks. A "political scientist and human rights activist,"
Ahmed argues that 9-11 is being used as a pretext for domestic repression.
These three books underscore a political pattern: the left sees
the war as about much more than meets the eye; whereas the right
sees no conspiracy.
The three also represent major ways to define the scope of a conspiracy.
Perhaps because he is a social scientist, Chomsky takes the long
view, putting 9-11, which he compares to the War of 1812, into the
broader context of 200 years of American history and "governmentality."
Perhaps out of journalistic habit, Brisard and Dasquiè keep narrowly
focused on the connections between 9-11, the Middle East, and Central
Asia. Their bottom line is that U.S. oil consumption and craving
are responsible for 9-11. In the manner of a think-tank scholar,
Ahmed documents a lengthy and broad historical narrative stretching
from 1986 into 2002. After documenting the events leading up to
9-11, and arguing that it should have been easily prevented, Ahmed
argues that it has "benefited" the government, and the weapons and
oil industries.
A number of 9-11 conspiracy theorists have made the connection
between the events of 9-11 and the burning of the Reichstag by the
Nazi Party as a pretext for eliminating German communists and cracking
down on other domestic dissent. Chomsky and Ahmed emphasize this
broader purpose behind the conspiracy, while Brisard and Dasquiè
view 9-11 as either a defensive or a retributive strike by Afghanistan.
Chomsky and Ahmed, however, disagree on the complicity of U.S. intelligence
agencies in allowing or fomenting 9-11. Chomsky counts 9-11 as one
of many U.S. intelligence failures; Ahmed presents an array of evidence
showing that U.S. intelligence was aware of 9-11 preparations. The
"9-11 as Pretext" narrative has two levels: first, broader conspiratorial
aims of U.S. hegemony, and second the complex machinery necessary
to allow the actual events of 11 September 2001 to occur. Chomsky
tends to focus on the first level; Ahmed the second.
In a series of interviews given in the first few weeks following
9-11, Chomsky puts it into the broader matrix of corporate-governmental
conspiracy that he has spent much of his scholarly career carefully
documenting and recounting. He remarks on the failure of the U.S.
intelligence community (used primarily to support business and military
interests rather than "Homeland security"), and argues that 9-11
should be investigated and pursued as a crime rather than as a war.
Unlike Chomsky, who claims that 9-11 resulted from incompetence,
Ahmed argues, "The tragic catastrophe of 11th September, which apparently
was permitted to occur by the Bush administration ... allowed
the U.S. to expand, consolidate and empower its hegemony, both at
home and abroad, to an unprecedented level" (18). Several U.S. intelligence
services—the CIA chief among them—played pivotal roles in allowing
9-11 and using it as a pretext for war (Ahmed 23-4, 34-5).
Chomsky's broader historical scope leads him to discuss the long-term
implications of 9-11 as pretext: "Such terrorist atrocities are
a gift to the harshest and most repressive elements on all sides,
and are sure to be exploited—already have been in fact—to accelerate
the agenda of militarization, regimentation, reversal of social
democratic programs, transfer of wealth to narrow sectors, and undermining
democracy in any meaningful form" (19). The goal of a conspiracy
behind 9-11 is to purify America, solidify its boundaries, militarize
its culture, and mobilize its population for a wartime economy.
Although the absolute idea of a visual or accentual racial purity
in America has dimmed—the idea of an "American Race," as Theodore
Roosevelt might have spoken of at the beginning of the twentieth
century—the Global War on Terror is meant as a purification of America's
ideals of rugged individualism, the free market, and patriotism.
This new American race might be more diverse in its appearance and
speech, but it also makes the ideal of the "American" an absolute
and necessary goal for global progress.
All three books point to the crucial issue of long-term U.S. involvement
by the Reagan, Bush I, and Clinton administrations in seeking to
stabilize and economically exploit Central Asia, and Afghanistan
in particular, as a factor leading to 9-11. Each also tries to contextualize
this within the history of the "Great Game" between Russia and Great
Britain in the nineteenth century to dominate Central Asia. Unlike
Chomsky, Ahmed and Brisard and Dasquiè view Afghanistan and Central
Asia as the primary target of the conspiracy. Brisard and Dasquiè
put it bluntly, "What we do know for sure is that from February
5 to August 2, 2001, the United States engaged in private and risky
discussions with the Taliban concerning geostrategic oil interests,
among other things... The suicide attacks of September 11 were
possibly the outcome of this initiative" (xxxiv). While Brisard
and Disquiè are strictly interested in a conspiracy surrounding
the projected oil and gas reserves of Central Asia, Ahmed sees the
U.S. goal of Central Asian hegemony as being more a means of maintaining
exclusive world power. While Chomsky clearly understands the place
of Afghanistan in 9-11, he sees the U.S. bombing of Khartoum, Sudan
in 1998 as being much more instrumental in leading to 9-11 (52-3).
Indeed, this bombing is one of the colossal intelligence failures
that Chomsky argues is leading directly to humanitarian disasters
bordering on genocide (45-6).
Each book also points to American collusion with Saudi Arabia as
being instrumental in leading to the events of 9-11. Saudi complicity
in 9-11 remains a widely held suspicion among many Americans. While
Chomsky and Ahmed analyze the broader Saudi governmental and cultural
influences on the 9-11 conspiracy, Brisard and Dasquié's thesis
itself hinges on a direct Saudi role in 9-11, and long-term U.S.
complicity with the Saudi royal family. At the heart of this narrative
is the long relationship between various U.S. administrations and
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to develop and exploit the oil resources
of the Arabian peninsula, culminating in efforts by the Clinton
and Bush administrations to arrange for the building of an oil pipeline
in Afghanistan, with the cooperation of the Taliban regime. The
second Bush administration plays a particularly large part in the
"Saudi Connection" version of 9-11, according to Brisard and Dasquié and Ahmed, because of its numerous connections to several multinational
oil companies. Chomsky, on the other hand, tends to downplay the
role of either the Bush administration or the Saudi royal family
in 9-11. And unlike Ahmed—who puts bin Laden into a broader historical
context—Brisard and Dasquié focus their entire argument on links
between the Saudi royal family and bin Laden, arguing that the two
continue to share deep ideological and economic ties.
The importance of Osama bin Laden to the 9-11 conspiracy varies
considerably among the three books. Ahmed and Chomsky tend to minimize
his importance outside that of symbolism, while Brisard and Dasquié judge his individual role to be pivotal (evidenced by the subtitle
of their book). In this sense, Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda are
the perfect "official" enemy (Chomsky classifies U.S. enemies as
either "official" or not); if they could be associated with any
state other than Saudi Arabia, it would be the regime that controlled
most of Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda are used to put
a face on an enemy that is not only faceless, but appears to be
stateless, transnational, and certainly "monstrous" (Puar and Rai
118-20). This simultaneously allows a diffusion of the possible
targets for political and military action—leading to world war—and
permits an indefinite prolongation of hostilities against an implacable
enemy (Rumsfeld's "long war"). As a result, ideology—politics and
religion—also plays a large role in the "Saudi Connection" narrative,
though not in a symmetrical manner, according to Chomsky and Ahmed.
Unlike Brisard and Dasquié, who describe bin Laden as being motivated
by financial power rather than spiritual or political power (103-11),
Chomsky and Ahmed describe bin Laden's motivation as largely religious
(Chomsky 31-2, 59; Ahmed 19-54, 78). Each of the books uses the
several failed attempts to capture bin Laden as evidence of conspiracy.
How is a war named? Is it named before, during, or after hostilities?
Can it change over the course of history? Does it vary from language
to language? Former CIA Director James Woolsey recently characterized
this period as "WW IV," counting the Cold War as WW III. How a war
is named sheds light on history and those empowered to author it.
As such, how a war is named is also illustrative of the vexed relationship
of signified to signifier. The process of naming wars certainly
seems to have bearing on some poststructuralist notions about the
function of the signifier and the author in modernity. What has
come to be known as the "Bush Doctrine" is in fact the substitution
of world war for a foreign policy according to Chomsky, Brisard
and Dasquié, and Ahmed. This substitution simultaneously permits
the Bush administration to pursue a peace-time domestic policy.
Accusations of conspiracy surround many of the great "victories,"
"failures," and "tragedies" throughout history. This is more than
coincidence; talk of conspiracy requires the belief that conscious
contributions for betrayal—through action or inaction—by numerous
official and unofficial organizations, authorities, and governments
is necessary for these unprecedented events. It is precisely the
scale of such world historical events—like 9-11, Pearl Harbor, the
assassinations of JFK, RFK, and MLK, the Great Depression, the sinking
of the USS Maine, and even the sinking of the Titanic—that demands
the power of complex, shadowy conspiracies to reaffirm the ultimate
power of the governmental system trusted to keep order in the first
place. Only a conspiracy could be powerful enough to shake the foundations,
symbols, and bodies of civilized power, especially if that power
is the only remaining super power.
On September 11, 2001, according to The 9-11 Commission Report,
"Air Force One arrived at Offutt [Air Force Base] at 2:50 P.M. At
about 3:15, President Bush met with his principal advisors through
a secure video teleconference. [Then-National Security Advisor]
Rice said President Bush began the meeting with the words, 'We're
at war'" (326). It is precisely the excess of war-time affect made
possible by 9-11 that allows Bush to run the domestic side of the
nation in a manner heretofore not possible during war. This is what
makes it possible to simultaneously advocate massive tax-cuts for
the wealthiest while also invoking the "post-9-11 era" in response
to every question of his power. Only the unrestrained security response
of a civilized nation can defeat conspiracy in the end. This is
the result of the transgressive nature of blood Chomsky refers to,
what he calls the "spiraling of violence" characterizing events
after 9-11: "What has been announced is a virtual declaration of
war against all who do not join Washington in its resort to violence,
however it chooses. The nations of the world face a 'stark choice':
join us in our crusade or 'face the prospect of certain death and
destruction' (R. W. Apple, New York Times, 14 September). Bush's
rhetoric of September 20 forcefully reiterates that stance. Taken
literally, it's virtually a declaration of war against much of the
world" (qtd. in Chomsky 63-4). Bush's address to a joint session
of Congress on 20 September 2001 is intended to be akin to Franklin
D. Roosevelt's declaration of war following Pearl Harbor. As a result,
Bush has been able to generate the affect of a world war without
simultaneously having the carnage.
Each of the three books also makes implicit arguments for how to
solve the problems raised by 9-11 and prevention of future 9-11s.
Chomsky advocates seeking social justice on a global scale and treating
9-11 as a criminal act (62-3). Brisard and Dasquié warn that it
was the expedience of using bin Laden and his mujahideen to fight
the Soviet occupation that enabled 9-11 (141-46). Ahmed writes his
book as a call for a thorough public investigation of events leading
to 9-11, and its subsequent cover-up (279-82). Nevertheless, an
air of conspiracy will always surround 9-11. The events and ideologies
which made it possible continue to flourish and are being governmentalized
globally.
* * *
Works Cited
The 9-11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. New York: Norton, n.d.
Apple, R. W. Jr. "No Middle Ground." New York Times 14 Sept. 2001.
A1.
Chomsky, Noam and Edward S. Herman. Manufacturing Consent: The
Political Economy of the Mass Media. New York: Pantheon, 1988.
Orwell, George. 1984. 1949. New York: Harcourt. New York: Penguin,
1950.
Puar, Jasbir K. and Amit S. Rai. "Monster, Terrorist, Fag: The
War on Terrorism and the Production of Docile Patriots." Social
Text 20.3 (2002): 117-48.
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